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INDIVIDUAL UTILITY  
IN A CONTEXT OF ASYMETRIC SENSITIVITY  
TO PLEASURE AND PAIN :  
AN INTERPRETATION OF BENTHAM’S FELICIFIC CALCULUS 
 
André Lapidus* / Nathalie Sigot** 
European Journal of the History of Economic Thought  
7(1) Spring 2000, pp. 45-78 
 
 
 
“Coupe les arbres, si tu veux, casse aussi les pierres 
mais prends garde, 
prends garde à la lumière livide de l’utilité” 
(André Breton, Paul Eluard, L’Immaculée Conception) 
 
0. Introduction: after Jevons, who needs Bentham ? 
 It is generally agreed that the developments that Jeremy Bentham devoted to the 
positive aspects of the “principle of utility” exerted some influence over the rise of modern 
analysis of individual behaviour (see, for example, Stark 1946; Schumpeter 1954 or, more 
recently, Black 1988). Such an opinion would be confirmed by Jevons’ acknowledgement of 
his being indebted to the Benthamite calculus of pleasure and pain (1871:271). Meanwhile, 
Jevons’ decision to root his own contribution in Bentham’s work rather than in more recent 
accounts of utilitarianism – such as John Stuart Mill’s – is far from being some kind of ritual 
tribute, paid to the founder of the doctrine: Bentham was invoked in order both to testify the 
break with British political economy of the second half of the nineteenth century, and to give 
this break the legitimacy of an ancient tradition. 
                                                 
* University of Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, CHPE. Address for correspondence: CHPE, Maison des 
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1 “The theory which follows is entirely based on a calculus of pleasure and pain”; see also Jevons, 
1862: § 2-7. 
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 It could be argued, then, that Jevons, among others, inherited some parts of the 
Benthamite legacy. Nonetheless, this does not contradict the idea that some essential features 
of Bentham’s felicific calculus had been given up in the analysis of utility introduced in the 
Theory of Political Economy. Therefore, this paper precisely aims at restituting these aspects 
of the Benthamite scope, cancelled out by Jevons’ contribution, but in no way inconsistent 
with contemporary approach to the analysis of utility. 
 To put it briefly, Jevons not only explicitly added differential calculus to some 
canonical representation of the individual which took shape since the mid eighteenth century; 
but he also locked up this individual into given tastes and sensitivity to pleasure and pain. 
Since Jevons, in other words, it has become usual to identify an economic agent by an 
exogenous order of preferences, or function of utility. Now, it must be recalled that such was 
not the case within Bentham’s writings (see Sigot 1995: 26-74): although the Benthamite 
individual is unambiguously submitted to “these sovereign masters, pain and pleasure 
” (Bentham 1789: 1), he is, for this very reason, a changing individual. His preferences could 
no longer be considered as simply given, but as the outcome of the pleasure and pain that he 
previously enjoyed and suffered. More importantly, perhaps, than its use of the marginal 
principle, is the fact that Jevons’ contribution surreptitiously led subsequent writers to desert 
the old intuition of endogenous preferences, in favour of the seemingly more fruitful idea of 
exogenous preferences. 
 In this paper,we attempt to restore Bentham’s position in a more formal way – and in a 
more recent framework. Of course, this implies a restriction of the general principle, 
according to which tastes are submitted to permanent changes, to some simple analytical 
statement. The accepted changes therefore result from the individuals’ ability to anticipate a 
change in their situation. Consequently, the agent’s preference order will be viewed as 
depending on his initial situation, and on asymmetric sensitivity to gains and losses, relative 
to this situation (section 1). Bentham clearly expressed this idea when he argued that “the 
pleasure of gaining is not equal to the evil of losing” (1785-6: 331). 
 This leads to discuss the coexistence of multiple preference orders on the set of final 
situations, which might characterise a same individual (section 2). It will be shown that they 
are consistent, in the sense that they are associated to an “anticipated utility function”, 
depending on an initial situation x(t0), and on an anticipated trajectory {x(t)}. Two important 
consequences proceed from the existence of an anticipated utility function.  
Assuming that the agent’s effectual choices follow his preferences, the first 
consequence is a representation of economic behaviour which allows what would to-day be 
considered as preference reversal phenomena (section 3), of which typical illustration is 
provided by Bentham’s analysis of the optimal labour contract, and which could be extended 
to the analysis of demand and equilibrium. 
 3
 The second consequence rests upon the ability to anticipate. Anticipation does not 
only concern the pleasure or pain generated by a move {x(t)} from x(t0) to x(tf): it also 
concerns the new preference order resulting from this move. The agent is then faced with 
rival preference orders, associated with the moves he is able to achieve. Taking fully into 
account the possibility to anticipate, henceforth disconnects the question of preferences from 
that of choices. This can be interpreted as the introduction of a true deliberation, following the 
simple assessment of utility, into the theory of individual economic behaviour (section 4). 
Several features of early utilitarianism thus appear as closely linked: the systematic search for 
incentives is a response to a world in which the ability to anticipate fails among individual 
agents, and the emphasis on education is a way to improve this ability to anticipate. From an 
analytical point of view, this deliberation – from the legislator, or from the individual – aims 
then at achieving this non-conflicting order of preferences, on which Jevons was to build 
utility theory. 
 
1. De gustibus est disputandum 
 One needs to be an economist trained in general equilibrium theory to assert without 
irony that an economic agent might be characterised by given preference order and set of 
choice, and that if preferences can indeed change, the reasons and the magnitude of this 
change are beyond our competence as economists . Otherwise, this is a rather schematical 
view. On the one hand, one could object, for instance, that Hayek (in the analysis of the 
mental process giving birth to a spontaneous order) or Duesenberry (1949) (with the relative 
income hypothesis) move away from the idea that exogeneous preferences generate economic 
behaviour. On the other hand, as D. Requier-Desjardins (1996) noticed it, such contributions 
like C.C. Von Weizsäcker (1971) (which stresses the difficulty to build short-term 
indifference curves, since the individual is insufficiently informed on his preferences on the 
long run) shifts from the traditional view, in the sense that it focuses on the necessity to 
identify the law of evolution of individual preferences. But Becker’s and Stigler’s 1977 
attempt to reduce endogeneous to exogeneous preferences illustrate the fact that, more than a 
powerful instrument for economic calculus, the latter are also a flexible concept, able to grasp 
what is usually considered as a change in tastes 2. In contrast, it is a common sense opinion 
that our tastes might change just as we are, ourselves, changing, and that these changes are 
worth being examined by economists.  
                                                 
2 Becker and Stigler (1977) favoured several ways of reducing seemingly endogeneous to exogeneous 
preferences. For instance, 1) a change in shadow prices rather than in tastes (an “unilluminating ‘explanation’”, 
said Becker and Stigler, 1977 : 78), illustrated by A. Marshall’s example of good music generating an increasing 
demand for good music; 2) additional information, such as transmitted by publicity, which gives birth to a 
consistent change in choices – not in tastes.  
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 Our primary intuition is that such a common sense opinion was, in some way, as trite 
for most scholars working on economic matters before the end of the nineteenth century, as it 
is now. Of course, Bentham was one of those scholars. But, whereas the assumption that 
preferences are exogenous to individual is nowadays explicit, the reverse assumption  – 
endogenous preferences – hardly supplies direct evidence in Bentham’s writings. 
Nevertheless, indirect evidence (§ 1.1. and 1.2.) seems conclusive. This will lead us to focus 
on a principle recalled by Bentham on several occasions, and to which too little attention has 
been previously paid: “pleasure of gaining is not equal to the evil of losing” (§ 1.3.). 
 
1.1. An interpretation of the taxonomy of pleasures and pains 
 Chapter IV of Bentham’s Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation [1789] does not seriously challenge the current conception of an economic agent 
ruled by a given order of preferences. Dedicated to the identification of the dimensions of 
pleasure and pain 3 and to the resulting measure of happiness, these pages constituted the first 
step in the constitution of Jevon’s value theory (1862: 282-3 and 1871: 27 and 33-4), but this 
latter seems to have been wise enough to abandon promptly Bentham’s pioneering 
perspective: trying to measure utility through that which causes it, might still be of some 
interest for a psychologist; it is a long time since it is only of poor relevance for an economist. 
 But chapter V’s obsessional taxonomy of pleasures and pains is far more puzzling, 
since the fourteen elementary pleasures and the twelve elementary pains which Bentham 
carefully distinguishes 4 help the reader understand, not that the value attributed to a thing is 
connected to the happiness it provides, but the reasons of this happiness, in terms of the 
natures of the pleasures and pains involved. 
                                                 
3  Bentham isolated four criteria, namely: “intensity”, “duration”, “certainty or uncertainty”, 
“propinquity or remoteness”, to which he added “fecundity”, purity” and “extent” (1789: 29-30). 
4  The simple pleasures which Bentham enumerates run as follows: “1. The pleasure of sense. 2 The 
pleasures of wealth. 3. The pleasures of skill. 4. The pleasures of amity. 5. The pleasures of a good name. 6. The 
pleasure of power. 7. The pleasures piety. 8. The pleasures of benevolence. 9. The pleasures of malevolence. 10. 
The pleasures of memory. 11. The pleasures of imagination. 12. The pleasures of expectation. 13. The pleasures 
dependent on association. 14. The pleasures of relief”. The pains are those of “1. [...] privation. 2. The pains of 
the senses. 3. The pains of awkwardness. 4. The pains of enmity. 5. The pains of an ill name. 6. The pains of 
piety. 7. The pains of benevolence. 8. The pains of malevolence. 9. The pains of the memory. 10. The pains of 
the imagination. 11. The pains of expectation. 12. The pains dependent on association” (1789: 33-4). Bentham 
did not find necessary to give any justification for this “catalogue”. He just noticed that this was “what seemed 
to be a complete list of the several simple pleasures and pains of which human nature is susceptible”, adding that 
“[i]t might perhaps have been a satisfaction to the reader, to have seen an analytical view of the subject, taken 
upon an exhaustive plan, for the purpose of demonstrating the catalogue to be what he it purports to be, a 
complete one. The catalogue is in fact the result of such an analysis; which, however, I thought it better to 
discard at present, as being of too metaphysical a cast, and not within the limits of this design” (Ibid.: 34 n. 1). 
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 These reasons are not simply extra-economical considerations. Whereas Bentham’s 
chapter IV is consistent with the contemporary idea of an economic agent characterised by 
exogenous preferences, chapter V does not manifest the same consistency. The picture of the 
individual drawn by Bentham is not only a far wider picture than the one commonly 
associated to an economic agent: it also implies a different picture of this economic agent. 
  More precisely, the pleasure of the senses made up from the pleasure of  novelty, the 
pleasure of acquisition, as an instance of the pleasure of wealth, the pleasures of memory, and 
those of relief, the pains of privation or of senses frustration, of the memory, of imagination 
or of expectation (1789: 33-42), could hardly be imagined within the framework of an 
individual whose tastes and sensitivity to pleasures and pains remain unchanged. As soon as 
we investigate not only the dimensions and measure of pleasures and pains, but also the 
content of the latter, we are urged to acknowledge that the actualisation of such pleasure or 
such pain will change the preferences of the one who enjoyed or suffered it. This 
interpretation is confirmed by Bentham’s chapter VI, in which he tries to isolate the thirty-two 
circumstances (health, strength, knowledge, etc...) which might  affect the influence on 
happiness of such pleasure or pain. Obviously, whereas age, government or – to a certain 
extent – health, seem to be external circumstances, most of the latter are not strictly external 
but, at least partly (like religion, profession, or habitual occupation), a consequence of the 
individual’s previous choices. 
 This complex drawing of a changing individual should not be a surprising one within 
Bentham’s work. It is linked both to the psychological foundations of his interpretation of the 
principle of utility, and to his social project. 
 
1.2. Associationism at the root of individual changes 
 The connection between the principle of utility and associationist psychology, 
inspired, at Bentham’s time, by the works of Hume and Hartley (Bentham, 1789: 43-69), 
deserves special attention. This connection implies that the conclusions of the felicific 
calculus depend, for each individual, on a continuous interaction between feelings, ideas, and 
sentiments. But this interaction is also a source of permanent transformations of the 
individual, of renewed receptivity to the different events which originate these major feelings 
– pleasure and pain. 
 This possibility of transformation, opened by associationist psychology, therefore 
constitutes a prerequisite of the numerous – and generally sterile 5 – projects that Bentham 
                                                 
5  This commentary must be qualified. It is usually acknowledged that Bentham’s influence on penal 
law is far from negligible. In England, for instance, this influence was both direct and indirect, through some of 
his followers, like John Austin and Henry Brougham (E. Halevy, 1901-4). According to J. Pradel (1989: 49-50), 
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elaborated all along his intellectual life. As a social reformer, he never imagined that 
institutional changes would only modify the set of choices of each individual, leaving 
unchanged his preferences. When he wrote on such topics as the penitential system, the 
management of the poor, the liberty of the press, or the education, his objective was to change 
human beings, and not only institutions – i.e. preferences, and not only sets of choices. It is 
worth noticing that such a conception of social reforms was not a real issue of the debates in 
which Bentham was involved: after all, even his opponents shared this simple and quite 
common idea that changes in institutions might generate changes in human beings 6. 
However, the link with associationism was a typical feature of his position. At first glance, 
one could imagine that this link was rather loose in early writings. But it did become explicit 
after Bentham’s meeting with James Mill in 1808, when collaboration between the two men 
gave birth to what Elie Halévy called “philosophical radicalism”. 
 A significant example of the part played by associationist psychology can be found in 
Bentham’s increasing interest in education 7. Some ten years before his meeting with J. Mill, 
Bentham took up the theme of education as a particular side of the Poor question, which held 
all his attention  (1797-8). But in 1816, when he published Chresthomathia, education was 
shown to be of the utmost importance, to such an extent that his commitment in favour of the 
“Lancasterian system” induced him to offer a part of his own garden, so as to edificate there a 
“Chresthomatic School”. As usual, the project collapsed, and only the creation of the 
University College of London, in 1830, has kept trail of the initial ambition of its author. 
Accordingly, although J. Mill never made Bentham discover an unexplored field, he certainly 
helped him strengthen an argument. 
 The foundations of J. Mill’s analysis of education are provided in the article 
“Education”, written between 1818 and 1819 and published in the Encyclopaedia Britannica 
and in his Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind [1829]. For J. Mill, human 
behaviour depends on sequences of ideas which are copies of sensations. “The sensations 
which we have through the medium of the senses”, wrote J. Mill, “exist only by the presence 
of the object and cease upon its absence [...]. It is known part of our constitution, that when 
our sensations cease, by the absence of their objects, something remains [...]. We have two 
classes of feelings; one that which exists when the object of sense is present; another, that 
which exists after the object of sense has ceased to be present. The one class of feelings I call 
SENSATIONS; the other class of feelings I call IDEAS” (1829: 51-2). The connection between 
                                                                                                                                                        
Bentham’s stamp is also evident on the French penal code of 1810, on the Louisiana code of 1821, or on the 
Indian code of 1833. 
6  See, for instance, Sir G.O. Paul’s indictment of Bentham’s Panopticon, which reflected the opinion of 
the Parliamentary Commission which, reexamining the project in 1810, jeopardized its realisation (Semple 1993: 
268 and Hume 1974: 48). 
7  On the question of education in early utilitarianism, see Sigot 1995: 271-87. 
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sensations and ideas is governed, according to J. Mill, by two rules of association (ibid.: 71): 
the “synchronous order” – which Hume called “space contiguity” in the Treatise on Human 
Nature – and the “successive order” – which refers to the Humian principles of “contiguity in 
time” and “causation” 8. And the strength of this connection will, in return, depend on the 
strength of the sensations, and on the frequency of their association. Here lies the theoretical 
basis of the educational project: modifying human behaviour means either acting upon the 
sequences of ideas or creating new ones. Education hence consists in implementing 
“virtuous” sensations of different magnitudes and, above all, in increasing the frequency of 
their association (1818-9: 147 and 151). 
 
1.3. The pleasure of gaining is not equal to the evil of losing 
 No doubt, such a complex picture of the determinants of individual behaviour limited 
drastically the part of the Benthamite legacy that Jevons was ready to make his own: founding 
economic calculus on the basis of a given utility function was already a difficult task, which 
required nearly a century after Jevons to be achieved; but the enterprise would surely have 
been bound to fail with a utility function submitted to continuous changes. 
 However, some kinds of changes, playing a crucial part in Bentham’s analysis, could 
nowadays be dealt with in the framework of usual utility theory. They appear in Bentham’s 
theory as the consequence of a general principle concerning the respective effects of gains 
and losses on individual happiness. While discussing the efficiency of legal institutions, 
Bentham introduced it as follows: “pleasure of gaining is not equal to the evil of losing” 
(1785-6: 331). As such, the legislator was expected to take it into account when instituting 
incentives aiming at modifying individual behaviour. Over half a century, Bentham expressed 
the same idea in different contexts: in the “Preface” to the Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation (p. xxv, n. 1), in Pannomial Fragments (p. 229), or in the manuscript 
Sur les Prix (f. 48). Although Bentham did succeed to systematise the consequences of this 
statement on the art of the legislator, the idea of an asymmetry between pain and pleasure, 
granting more weight to the former at the expense of the latter, was far from being 
pathbreaking when it appeared under his pen. As M. Guidi (1993) noticed it, its origin could 
be traced back to Locke, Verri or Maupertuis 9. Anyway, this principle was to Bentham 
                                                 
8  For J. Mill, Hume’s causation could be reduced to contiguity in time (1829: 110). 
9 However, M. Guidi (1993: 51-8) advocated the thesis of a break within Bentham’s work, which gave 
birth to a “perfect symmetry” between pain and pleasure. This interpretation needs to be qualified. It seems that 
as Bentham went along his work, he became more and more aware of the negative effects, on general happiness, 
of individual asymmetric sensitivity to pain and pleasure (see infra § 3.3). As a result, he seems to have 
established a distinction between i) the positive dimension of the principle of utility, from an individual point of 
view, according to which asymmetric sensitivity to pain and pleasure keeps on with playing a decisive part in 
individual behaviour, and ii) its normative dimension, from the point of view of the legislator, which rests on 
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universal enough to be called an “axiom”, and unreasonable enough to be viewed as an 
“axiom of Mental Pathology”. 
 A primary intuition of the meaning of this principle would be that it just states that 
marginal utility is decreasing. But it is not necessary to make such a strong assumption as the 
concavity of the utility function to give sense to the principle “pleasure of gaining is not equal 
to the evil of losing”. Let us assume that the agent’s initial situation is represented 
by x x x0 1
0
2
0= ,c h . When he anticipates a variation dx of his situation, he also anticipates a 
variation dU of his level of utility. Imagine then two opposite anticipated variations of the 
amount of good 1, dx1 and −dx1 (where dx1 0≥ ), leading to a same anticipated variation of 
utility dU. Asserting that the “pleasure of gaining is not equal to the evil of losing”, therefore 
means that dx2 will be greater, relatively to dx1, when it has to compensate a loss −dx1 than 
when it has to compensate a gain dx1. Of course, a similar conclusion could be obtained, 
assuming anticipated variations dx2 and −dx2 . This clearly means that, if a function of 
anticipated utility exists, it is not continuously differentiable. In x0, its left-hand first 
derivatives, u1
−  and u2
− , should be respectively greater than its right-hand derivatives, u1
+  and 
u2
+ , so that the marginal rates of substitution might be ordered as follows: 
 u u u u u u1 2 1 2 1 2
− + + + + −> >        [1.1] 
 u u u u u u1 2 1 2 1 2
− + − − + −> >        [1.2] 
 If we remain in the neighbourhood of x0, this representation is not so far removed from 
the traditional one: it also allows the function of anticipated utility to be locally increasing 
and strictly quasi-concave. The only noticeable difference is that in x0, the marginal rate of 
substitution depends on the respective signs of the anticipated moves dx1 and dx2. 
 Up to this point, Bentham’s principle might seem a little bit “pathological”, but it does 
not bear expressly preferences changes. In order to obtain this, we need to take more 
completely into account the ability to anticipate that it presupposes. The above mentioned dx 
moves are anticipated moves. The resulting dU are anticipated variations of utility. 
Therefore, if an individual is able to anticipate the consequences of a move, in terms of utility, 
he is also able to anticipate a change in his initial situation. But, as he anticipates such a 
change, he also anticipates a move of the discontinuity of the marginal rate of substitution 
and, consequently, a change in his local preferences. 
 More generally, the idea that “pleasure of gaining is not equal to the evil of losing” 
implies that sensitivity to gain and loss will change along with the initial situation. In this 
respect, this seemingly simple statement of Bentham allows, alone, preferences over final 
                                                                                                                                                        
some kind of symmetry between pain and pleasure - a symmetry which progressively forced itself upon 
individual agents, through deliberation and education (see infra § 4). 
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situations to be not given exeogenously, but relative to the agent’s initial situation. In what 
follows, we will explore some of its analytical consequences. 
 
2. A representation of “Benthamite” individual utility 
 Asymmetric sensitivity to gains and losses would not to-day imply the complete 
rejection of the analytical apparatus accumulated since Jevons. But it surely induces some 
revision. In particular, utility would appear as depending on a trajectory mentally followed by 
the agent (§ 2.1.). On first view, such a representation seems rather puzzling, since it opens 
the path to the possibility that a same final situation of alternative trajectories is associated 
with different levels of utility. This gives rise to the identification of optimal trajectories, the 
final situations of which constitute maps of indifference relative to each initial situation (§ 
2.2.). 
2.1. Sensitivity to gains and losses and the anticipated utility function 
 In traditional theory of utility, the effects of a move dx from any initial situation x can 
be appreciated through the use of an invariant, the utility function. The invariant, here, will be 
given by a set of four differentiable, increasing and strictly quasi-concave functions, 
F x F x F x F x++ +− −+ −−b g b g b g b g,  ,  ,  and . Denoting their respective gradients: 
 
 f f fx x x++ + +=a f a f a fc h1 2,  
 f f fx x x−+ − +=a f a f a fc h1 2,  
 f f fx x x+− + −=a f a f a fc h1 2,  
 f f fx x x+− + −=a f a f a fc h1 2,  
it is assumed that, for each x ≥ 0, 
 f x f x1 1
− +>b g b g         [2.1] 
 f x f x2 2
− +>b g b g         [2.2]. 
If the effect on anticipated utility of any move dx from any initial situation x ≥ 0 is such that: 
 dU
f x dx dx dx
f x dx dx dx
f x dx dx dx
f x dx dx dx
=
≥
≥ ≤
≤ ≥
≤
R
S
||
T
||
++
+−
−+
−−
b g
b g
b g
b g
if ,  
if ,  
if ,  
if ,  
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
0
0 0
0 0
0
      
this effect will be the same as the one which would be expected from conditions [1.1]-[1.2], 
that is, “pleasure of gaining is not equal to the evil of losing”. 
 It must be noted that although conditions [2.1]-[2.2] do not concern directly the 
marginal rates of substitution, but magnitudes usually interpreted as marginal utilities, they do 
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not imply anything like a cardinal utility function: it is obvious that the same conditions are 
satisfied if F x F x F x F x++ +− −+ −−b g b g b g b g,  ,  ,  and  are submitted to any monotone increasing 
transformation.  
 Let us now take explicitly in consideration the anticipated nature of the move dx: 
anticipating dx means that at date t, we anticipate that at t + dt (dt > 0), our situation will 
move to x t x t dtb g b g+ ′  (where ′ = =x t dt x t dt dxb g b g∂ ∂ ). The anticipated variation of utility 
dU, at any initial situation x, generated by an anticipated move dx, can now be defined as: 
 dU x x x dtt t t= ′ ′ϕ a f a fb g a f,        [2.3] 
where ϕ x t x tb g b gc h, ′  is a function of sensitivity to gains and losses, such that: 
 ϕ x x
f x x x
f x x x
f x x x
f x x x
t ta f a fb g
b g
b g
b g
b g
, ′ =
′ ′ ≥
′ ≥ ′ ≤
′ ≤ ′ ≥
′ ′ ≤
R
S
||
T
||
++
+−
−+
−−
if ,  
if ,  
if ,  
if ,  
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
0
0 0
0 0
0
 
 Sensitivity to gains and losses, described by equation [2.3], suggests that the variations 
of anticipated utility between an initial and a final date – say, t0 and tf –, are obtained by 
integrating dU along a trajectory {x(t)}. Anticipated utility then appears as a function, not of a 
final situation x(tf), but of a trajectory {x(t)}. This means that an individual’s ability to 
anticipate the consequences, on his utility, of a move dx x dt= ′  goes along with his ability to 
anticipate the consequences of a new move, once dx is achieved. However, note that 
anticipated utility should not be understood as effective utility enjoyed by an agent, but just as 
the anticipation, at t0, of utility at tf, which depends on the evolution of sensitivity to gains and 
losses along a trajectory. For convenience, we will admit that the anticipated utility of 
remaining in x(t0) at date t0 is 0. Henceforth, anticipated utility of a trajectory {x(t)} is given 
by: 
 U x x x x dtt t t t
t
t fa fl qc h a f a fb g a f= ′ ′z ϕ ,
0
      [2.4]. 
It must be stressed that ϕ x xt ta f a fb g, ′  is piecewise continuous. More precisely, discontinuity 
occurs at each date when the sign of at least one component of  the right-hand derivative of 
x(t) – hence, of dx – changes10.  
 It is clear that if time is important here, it is only to the extent that it provides an index 
of the order of the situations anticipated along {x(t)}: it entails, in itself, neither utility nor 
                                                 
10The anticipated utility of a trajectory {x(t)} appears as a piecewise continuous function. For example, let 
′ ′ >x x1 2 0,  for t t0 ≤ < θ , and ′ <x1 0, ′ >x2 0 for θ ≤ ≤t t f . Then, 
 
U x t f x f x dt f x f x dt
F x F x F x F x
t
t f
t t f
b gm rd i
a fb g a fb gc h c hd i a fb ge j
= ′ + ′ + ′ + ′
= − + −
+ + − +
++ ++ −+ −+
z z1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
0
0
θ
θ
θ θ .
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desutility. What matters is then the shape of the oriented trajectory {x(t)} in the space of 
quantities x1 and x2; but the time length between any points of the trajectory has no incidence 
on anticipated utility. This seems to be a rather strong assumption: in fact, it is not. Time 
between t0 and tf is only time of choice, of possible individual deliberation. It is logically 
distinct from time involved in the definition of the quantities x1 and x2 – which might be of 
different dates –, or from time of the effective moves, which would eventually bring the 
individual from x(t0) to x(tf). By analogy, if we were in a walrasian framework, a similar 
conception of time would have prevailed to give an account of the tâtonnement process, but 
of course neither to define goods, nor to describe actual exchange. 
 From the point of view of the trajectory, now, {x(t)} denotes the mental process which 
will make it clear which utility the agent might anticipate after performing in his mind each 
step of the trajectory. It seems possible to argue successfully that the trajectory should be 
linear – and, moreover, that a discrete-time presentation might be more appropriate. Indeed, if 
I imagine a transaction which would lead me from an initial to a final situation by giving up 
good 1 in exchange of good 2, the intermediate situations are meaningless, and the utility that 
I anticipate in tf is F x F xt tf
−+ −+−c hd i a fb g0 ; it does not make sense for me to take into account 
such intermediary situation in which, for example, my endowment in good 1 would have 
increased, at the expense of my endowment in good 2. Quite different, of course, would be the 
case where an intermediary situation, for any reason, becomes significant. For instance, I 
could imagine exchanging good 1 for good 2, and then wonder how I would appreciate my 
previous initial situation, or some other situation which, from x(t0), was equivalent to the one 
I would have reached. But in such cases, one should observe that {x(t)} would present itself 
as a concatenation of linear trajectories. 
 Nonetheless, in spite of these arguments which induce to restrict meaningful {x(t)}’s 
to linear – or concatenations of linear – trajectories, we will consider, in the following, that 
{x(t)} might be any continuous trajectory. 
2.2. Optimal trajectories and indifference maps 
 Given x t x0
0b g = , the anticipated utility function hence assigns an utility index 
U x ta fl qc h to any possible trajectory completed at any final situation x t fd i≥ 0. It is then 
evident that this utility index does not depend exclusively on the final situation but, more 
generally, on the entire trajectory. This raises the question of the characterisation of optimal 
trajectories { ( )}x t , such that anticipating a move from x(t0) = x0 to x(tf) = xf entails a 
maximum of anticipated utility. That is: 
 U x U xt ta fl qc h a fl qc h≥         [2.5] 
where x t x t0 0b g b g=  and x t x tf fd i d i= . 
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 Denote { ( )}~x t  a monotone trajectory along which no strict sign reversal occurs 
concerning the first derivatives ~ ′x1  and ~ ′x2 . It is easy to show that monotone trajectories are 
equivalent to optimal trajectories (see annexe 1). As a result, linear trajectories or 
concatenations of linear trajectories in which no strict reversal occurs, are also equivalent to 
monopone trajectories. 
 On the basis of optimal trajectories, it becomes possible to represent the map of 
anticipated indifference between the final situations of optimal trajectories sharing the same 
starting point, x0. Like in figure 1 below, each indifference curve is built with appropriate 
portions of the contours of F x++ b g, F x+− b g, F x−+ b g and F x−− b g. For instance, let U x t{ }1a fc h 
denote the anticipated utility of an optimal trajectory leading from x t x1 0 0b g =  to 
x t x xf1 1 0d i = > , and e1, e2 the respective quantities of goods 1 and 2 for which 
F e x F x e F x++ ++ ++= =1 20 10 2 1, ,c h c h c h. Then, the locus of the final situations of optimal 
trajectories granting the same anticipated utility as { }x t1a f  is such that:  
• if x x x x1 10 2 20≤ ≥, , 
 x F x F x e: ,−+ −+=b g c h10 2  
• if x x x x1 10 2 20≥ ≥,  
 x F x F x: ++ ++=b g c h1  
• if x x x x1 10 2 20≤ ≤,  
 x F x F e x: ,+− +−=b g c h1 20 . 
 The resulting  map of indifference, of course looks like the traditional one. However, 
four major differences should be noted: 
1. The utility dealt with here, is anticipated utility, determined by a trajectory – not by an 
allocation. 
2. The situations x represent the final points of optimal trajectories. 
3. Although the indifference curves are convex to the origin, they show discontinuities in the 
marginal rate of substitution at each point of coordinates x x1 2
0,c h or x x10 2,c h. 
4. The map of indifference is relative to the initial situation x0. 
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Figure 1: Anticipated indifference map relative to x0 between the final situations of optimal trajectories 
 This last remark has outstanding consequences. If, for any reason, one anticipates a 
move from x0 to x1, and then from x1 to x2, this will lead to consider x1 as a new initial 
situation, hence modifying the indifference map. Obviously, as the indifference maps relative 
to x0 and to x1 are constructed on the basis of the contours of the same functions, they share 
common parts. The indifference map is hence the same for all situations x such that the signs 
of x xi i− 0 and x xi i− 1 (i = 1, 2) are the same (see figure 2). Otherwise, the agent might be 
faced with conflicting preference orders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Common parts of the indifference maps relative to x0 and to x1 
 
3. Conflicting preference orders 
 The coexistence of different preference orders is not as paradoxical as it seems. 
Acknowledging that individual’s choices are governed by anticipated utility diminishes the 
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importance of final situations: the latter are only the last points of trajectories involving gains 
and losses, which determine completely anticipated utility. Nonetheless, even an individual 
guided by the Benthamite principle of asymmetric sensitivity to gains and losses might be led 
to consider with some perplexity the potential effects of a behaviour which would induce him 
to prefer, in one case xA to xB, and in an other case xB to xA. This justifies the importance 
granted to possible modifications of preference orders.  
 
3.1. Preference reversal 
3.1.1. Preference reversal as a consequence of asymetric sensitivity to gains and 
losses 
 The phenomena of preference reversal and, among them, of preference reversal 
between initial situations, as particular cases of preference order modifications, deserve 
special attention. Preference reversal between initial situations simply consists in the fact that 
the order of preferences between two potential initial situations, say x0 and x1, depends upon 
the agent’s initial situation, again x0 and x1. It can be understood as a possible result of a 
comparison of the variations of anticipated utility associated with two couples of optimal 
trajectories 11.  
 
 The first couple is made up with a statu quo trajectory, denoted {x00(t)}, in which the 
agent anticipates remaining in x0 from t0 to t1, and a trajectory {x01(t)}, which leads him from 
x01(t0) = x0 to x01(t1) = x x1 0≠ . The second couple is formed in the same way, but the initial 
situation is now x1. Henceforth, {x11(t)} is the statu quo trajectory in which the agent stays in 
x1, and {x10(t)} is the trajectory which leads him to x10(t1) = x0. Let Δ0 and Δ1 be the respective 
difference of anticipated utility between the non-statu quo and the statu quo trajectories. The 
effective initial situation of the agent could be any xθ, at date tθ ≤ t0. x0 and x1 thus appear as 
significant intermediary situations of more complex trajectories, made from the concatenation 
of optimal trajectories. Δ0 (resp. Δ1) then answers to the following question: imagine that the 
agent is in xθ, and that he anticipates an optimal move to x0 (resp. x1); how would he 
appreciate moving further to x1 (resp. x0)? Clearly, preference reversal occurs when the signs 
of Δ0 and Δ1 are identical. Annexe 2 shows that such is the case when Δ0 and Δ1 are both 
negative (i.e. refer to possible deteriorations of the agent’s situation, in terms of anticipated 
utility), under some restrictive conditions. More precisely, it shows that the condition is that 
x1 should be situated between the curves F x F x+− +−=b g c h0  and F x F x−+ −+=b g c h0  (see figure 
3). If such is the case, the agent will always prefer the statu quo: when he is in x0, he 
                                                 
11 As the context makes it clear, the “ ^ ” will be omitted hereafter to denote optimal trajectories. 
 15
x2
anticipates a greater utility from remaining in x0 than from moving to x1; but when he is in x1, 
he also infers a greater utility from remaining in x1 than from moving to x0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Preference reversal between initial situations x0 and x1 
 
 This conclusion can easily be extended to the general case of preference reversal. 
Annexe 3 gives the formal conditions for such a generalisation: it shows that under some 
restrictive conditions, given two possible initial situations x0 and x1 and two possible final 
situations xA and xB, the agent anticipates a greater utility from a move to xA when he is, for 
instance, in x0 , and a greater utility from a move to xB when he is in x1. 
3.1.2. To what extent are “preference reversals” paradoxical ? 
 The above interpretation of preference reversals should be distinguished from the 
traditional one, in the line of the pioneering paper of S. Liechtenstein and P. Slovic (1971). 
Usually, Liechtenstein’s and Slovic’s paradoxical result – the highest reservation price is set 
by a decision maker to the lottery which he does not prefer – was analysed in the context of a 
theory of choice in uncertainty, so that it could be linked to other types of non-expected utility 
behaviour, like the well-known Allais’ paradox. A primary reaction to the evidence of 
preference reversals provided by experimental data, was to spare usual choice theory by 
discarding the mechanism used to find the decision maker’s selling price of lotteries 12. 
Meanwhile, the debate focused on a more critical area: at issue, was the attempt to explain 
Liechtenstein’s and Slovic’s result in terms of the violation of some fundamental axiom of the 
theory of choice, either the axiom of transitivity (Loomes and Sudgen 1982), or the 
independence axiom (Holt 1986) – this latter being directly linked to the linearity of the 
                                                 
12  The first systematic analysis of Liechtenstein’s and Slovic’s paper, from an economic point of view, 
seems to have been D. Grether and C. Plott (1979), who tried to show that the authors’ paradoxical results were 
a consequence of the method in use, but that the main hypotheses of the theory of choice were not seriously 
compromised. 
x1
x0 
x1 
F-+ (x0)
F-+ (x1)
F+- (x0)
F+- (x1)
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probabilities hypothesis in expected utility theory. Other contributions, like Quiggin (1982), 
modified the independence axiom and introduced a function of deformation of probabilities. 
The question is then to know whether violation of independence or transitivity is involved in 
preference reversals from a Benthamite point of view. 
 It might be argued that Bentham’s integration of probability as a dimension of 
pleasure or pain in chapter IV of the Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 
opens the path to a new interpretation of choices in uncertainty. A remark from K. Arrow to 
M. Machina in a conversation (Machina 1987: 130, n. 10), according to which “individuals 
display more risk aversion in the event of an opportunity loss, and less risk aversion in the 
event of an opportunity gain” suggests what a reformulation of Bentham’s position would 
look like: Arrow’s interpretation might evidently be understood  as an expression, in a risk 
context, of the Benthamite principle that the “pleasure of gaining is not equal to the evil of 
losing”. This would be an alternative to, for example, Quiggin’s decumulative probabilities, 
since it concerns directly not the perception of probabilities, but – like in Friedman and 
Savage (1948)’s article – the perception of utility. However, this possibly fruitful extension of 
the Benthamite asymetry between gains and losses will be deliberately neglected in the 
remainder of this paper. As a consequence, independence is clearly offside. 
 Does this mean that transitivity is transgressed ? Of course, not: indeed, it is not xA 
which is preferred to xB in one case, and xB which is preferred to xA in the other case, but two 
pairs of different trajectories leading to the same pair of final situations, but associated to 
different anticipated utility. Nothing, in this, seems to challenge the idea that preferences over 
trajectories are transitive. If “preference reversal” nonetheless appears paradoxical, it is only 
because we neglect the fact that xA and xB are each one introduced in the reasoning as the final 
situations of different trajectories, which are the true arguments of the function of anticipated 
utility. 
 Of course, this is puzzling, since the difference in anticipated utility rests neither on 
any difference in the final outcome of the process, nor on any cost involved in effective 
transactions, but on the individual’s mental process of exploring alternative decisions. 
Nonetheless, in contrast to the modern preference reversal approach, the Benthamite 
preference reversal cannot be considered as a threat against the independence or the 
transitivity axiom. 
 
3.2. An instance of what Bentham said : wage, effort, premium, penalty and the 
labour contract 
 Although the preceding results concerning preference reversal appear as a logical 
extension of the Benthamite principle, according to which the “pleasure of gaining is not 
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equal to the evil of losing”, we might wonder whether Bentham was or not clearly aware of 
these analytical consequences of his writings. However, the thorough investigation 
concerning the labour contract, to which are devoted numerous pages of the Rationale of 
Reward, witnesses on the one hand, his awareness of the possible implications of his so often 
recalled conceptions and, on the other hand, that access to the subtleties of differential and 
integral calculus was – at Bentham’s time – superfluous to grasp some major consequences of 
a psychological assumption like asymmetric sensitivity to gains and losses. 
 
 Like the Manual of Political Economy, the Rationale of Reward is an excerpt of a 
more ambitious work, published in French by Etienne Dumont under the title Théorie des 
Peines et des Récompenses (1811). In the “Preliminary Observations” to this last work, 
Bentham denounced the illusion of a formal symmetry between pain and pleasure, arguing at 
length that, from the point of view of the legislator, the threat of a penalty was much more 
efficient, as an individual incentive, than the promise of a reward. This primary principle was 
then applied to the analysis of the remuneration attached to public offices. 
 
 In fact, Bentham’s main point was to stress that, in most cases, wages did not reward 
anything: they did not ensure assiduity, nor application, and the performance of the minimal 
work normally required solely depended on the goodwill of their beneficiary. The problem of 
control of economic activities was then raised, at a time when it was far from being a 
worthwhile matter to the economists who were Bentham’s contemporaries. Meanwhile, he did 
not really suspect that the difficulty of control was an effect of the private character of the 
information held by individuals. More precisely, Bentham surely acknowledged that 
information was costful – this justified the existence of inspectors – but he did not imagine 
that it might be really private: one just has to go and see if the task had been performed. The 
difficulty of control then stems from the organisation of labour: if wages are a reward neither 
for the employee, nor for the inspector, the work has no chance to be correctly achieved. 
Bentham’s purpose was hence to provide appropriate incentives in order that work – 
including control – is performed efficiently. These incentives – in the particular meaning 
granted to the word here, since there is no hidden information to manage – chiefly consist in 
the form of the labour contract. 
 
 Bentham’s recommendation can easily be summarised: in order that the demanded 
effort be accomplished, give proper wages to the labourer, but submit them to the condition 
that he will be inflicted a penalty if the task is not correctly performed. Curiously, he did not 
favour the symmetric contract – which would stipulate low wages, possibly increased by a 
premium if the task is correctly performed – since it seems unable to induce the worker to 
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perform his job with all the necessary skill 13. Of course, the foundations of such a position 
seem rather mysterious to a modern economist, because the two contracts open the path to the 
same set of choice: a) high wages and high effort, and b) low wages and low effort. And if 
only final situations are taken into account for determining choices, there is no reason for a) to 
be chosen in one case, and b) in the other. 
 
 But Bentham’s vindication of the first type of contract becomes understandable if 
asymmetric sensitivity to pain and pleasure is considered, and if utility is perceived as 
anticipated utility, that is as the outcome of  a full trajectory leading either to high wages and 
effort, or to low wages and effort. To precise the argument, assume, like in figure 4, that these 
final situations are denoted A = (eh, wh), and B = (el, wl) – e and w being respectively the effort 
performed by the worker and his wage rate, and the subscripts h and l standing for “high” and 
“low”. Assume also that F B F A−+ −+>b g b g  and F A F B+− +−>b g b g . This is clearly a condition 
for preference reversal on initial situations, as described in § 3.1. Imagine then that at date 
t = t0, the worker is in the situation denounced by Bentham, that is, that he earns high wages 
and, since his work is not submitted to any control, that he performs a low effort. On figure 5, 
point C = (el, wh) corresponds to this situation. Denoting {xCC(t)}, {xCA(t)}, and {xCB(t)} the 
optimal trajectories which respectively lead the worker from C to C, A, and B, it is obvious 
that U x t U x tCC CAb gm re j b gm re j>  and U x t U x tCC CBb gm re j b gm re j> , but it is not absolutely clear 
which is the greater, from U x tCAb gm re j and U x tCB b gm re j 14. 
(e : inverted scale) 
Figure 4: The Benthamite labour contract 
                                                 
13 See Bentham 1782-7: 236: “It is by fear only and not by hope, that [a worker] is impelled to the 
discharge of his duty - by the fear of receiving less than he would otherwise receive, not by the hope of 
receiving more”. 
14  However, Bentham seems to advocate the idea that usually, the decrease in wages generates a higher 
pain than the increase in effort, so that in most cases, U x t U x tCA CB( ) ( )>l qb g l qb g. 
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 As long as no institutional constraint has the effect of withdrawing C from the set of 
choice of the worker, there is no inducement for his giving up C in favour of A or B. But 
suppose that such a reform has been instituted, through the conditions of the labour contract. 
Since preference reversal occurs between A and B, the worker will always anticipate a greater 
utility from an optimal move to A, than from the same move, followed by a second optimal 
move to B. Symmetrically, he will prefer moving to B, than moving to A after having moved 
to B. Hence, when Bentham advocates a labour contract of the type “high wages and 
conditional penalty”, he proposes the institutional device which places the worker in initial 
situation A. And, if the penalty is π = wh - wl, it is clear that the agent is not willing to move to 
B, and prefers statu quo: 
 U x t U x tAA ABb gm re j b gm re j> . 
Conversely, had the labour contract been of type “low wages and conditional premium”, this 
would have placed the agent in B, thus compromising his willingness to increase his income 
by means of his effort – that is, to move to A: 
 U x t U x tBB BAb gm re j b gm re j> .  
 
 Whereas, at first sight, Bentham’s analysis of the labour contract seems rather obscure, 
prisoner of technical and legal considerations, tedious even for the most lenient reader, it 
nevertheless shows to be a skilful proposal, which takes advantage of the worker’s 
preferences, in order to induce him to accept both to perform a high effort, and to be rewarded 
for this. Moreover, Bentham’s clear understanding of such analytical consequences of 
asymmetric sensitivity to gains and losses as preference reversal, becomes apparent behind 
his confidence in one type of contract at the detriment of the other. 
 
3.3. An instance of what Bentham didn’t say: demand, equilibrium, and the existence 
of anticipated non-exchange situations 
 Up to our knowledge, there is no explicit reference, in Bentham’s writings, to the link 
between anticipated utility and the identification of some kind of prefiguration of equilibrium. 
In the same way, no mention can be found of the relation with a function of demand. 
Nonetheless, equilibrium and demand appear – at least, to a modern economist – as natural 
extensions of utility theory. It is therefore not surprising that the same analytical device which 
made clear Bentham’s intuition concerning the specific case of the labour contract, might also 
give birth to more general statements. 
 
 The question of individual equilibrium can be dealt with in the framework of a simple 
representation of consumer behaviour, submitted to a linear budget constraint. Assume that, 
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from x0 = x(t0), the agent anticipates that at t = t1, prices will be p1 = p(t1). Maximising 
anticipated utility hence comes down to finding an optimal trajectory {x*(t)} solution of 
 
 max 
 subject to:  
U x x x x dt
p t x p t x t
t t t t
t
ta fl qc h a f a fb g a f
b g b g b g
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− =
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0
1
1
0
1 1 0
     [3.1]. 
Considering that the final situation x*(t1) of {x*(t)} is an equilibrium, it can be conveniently 
obtained by resolving static maximisation problems (see figure 5): 
• (a) If p t p t f x f x1 1 2 1 1 0 2 0b g b g c h c h> − +  – that is, if the price ratio is greater than 
the left-hand marginal rate of substitution – the agent is induced to supply good 1 and to 
demand good 2, so that x*(t1) is solution of 
 max 
 subject to:  
F x
p t x p t x
−+
− =
b g
b g b g1 0 1 0
      [3.2]. 
• (b) If f x f x p t p t f x f x1 0 2 0 1 1 2 1 1 0 2 0− + + −≥ ≥c h c h b g b g c h c h, it is clear that the agent 
is submitted to no incentive to move from x0, which appears as an equilibrium situation: 
 x*(t1) = x0. 
• (c)  If  f x f x p t p t1 0 2 0 1 1 2 1+ − >c h c h b g b g , the agent would improve his situation 
by exchanging good 2 for good 1, so that x*(t1) is now solution of 
 
 max 
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F x
p t x p t x
+−
− =
b g
b g b g1 0 1 0
      [3.3]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Individual equilibrium 
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p1(t1)/p2(t1)
 According to the relative positions of the anticipated price ratio and of the marginal 
rates of substitution, the net demand for good 1 or 2 will be (figure 6): 
• elastic to prices and derived from [3.2] in case (a); 
• inelastic and equal to zero when prices belong to the close interval of case (b); 
• elastic to prices and derived from [3.3] in case (c). 
 The existence of an interval of prices within which the demand function is inelastic 
and the demand is zero, has a significant consequence from the moment it is supposed that 
x*(t1) is only an intermediary situation. In x*(t1), the map of indifference has changed, so that, 
for instance, if p t p t f x f x f x f xt t1 1 2 1 1 2 1
0
2
0
1 1b g b g a fb g a fb g c h c h= >+ − + −* * , a small enough 
increase in the price ratio at t = t2 has no effect on demand: this latter remains x*(t1) - x0, even 
if the same increase, at t = t1 would have provided no incentive for the agent to anticipate a 
move from x0. This remark helps qualifying the interpretation of the demand function, such as 
defined above. Its specificity is not only to be partly price-inelastic. The link that it shows 
between net demand and anticipated price is subordinated to the fact that the demanded 
quantities are associated with the final situations of monotonous trajectories from x0. 
Otherwise – typically when p follows an arbitrary path {p(t)} – the agent might demand 
different quantities of goods 1 and 2 for the same relative prices at t1 and t2, according to the 
trajectory he anticipates to perform between t1 and t2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Net demand function for good 1 
 
 The three kinds of solutions to the dynamic maximisation program [3.1] play a 
determining part in the characterisation of general equilibrium. It can be shown (see annexe 4) 
that the usual contract curve moves into a compact contract set. From any initial situation 
q1 0
q1 = q1[p1(t1)/p2(t1)] 
          f1+(x0)/f2-(x0) 
f1-(x0)/f2+(x0) 
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exterior to the contract set, some relative prices allow an anticipated general equilibrium 
exchange on its border, so that the agents positive demands and supplies are all satisfied. On 
the contrary, within the contract set, general equilibrium is obtained only by the relative 
prices which ensure that each agent has zero net demands and supplies. This obviously means 
that each initial situation in the contract set is also the general equilibrium relative to itself. 
 
 On first view, the above construction only shows poor compatibility to the strict 
general equilibrium approach. The reason is that preferences depend on an anticipated 
trajectory, whereas it is usually admitted that they are given in general equilibrium. However, 
the opposition is not as clear-cut as it looks to be.  
 In the traditional case, it is by seek of convenience that we say that preferences are 
“exogenous”. In fact, general equilibrium theory only grasps, at t0, a certain state of 
preferences – even intertemporal –, technology and endowment, and identifies the price 
vector which makes them mutually consistent. Nothing, in the theory, excludes that at any t > 
t0, preferences might have changed, involving a revision of equilibrium. In other words, 
preferences might be considered exogenous in a general equilibrium context, only to the 
extent that no interest is borne to what happens i) after t0 ; and ii) before t0 – except, of course, 
to the tâtonnement process. 
 Now, it is clear that whereas the anticipated utility assumption does not require any 
attention to be paid to effective future events – that is, to what happens after the identification 
of equilibrium prices and trajectories – it focuses on the mental process which precedes the 
final choice and, moreover, any demand or supply expressed along a tâtonnement process. 
From this point of view, it brings to the forefront a “time of deliberation” which might rightly 
be neglected in traditional theory, since this latter assumed that no asymmetric sensitivity to 
gains and losses occurs. Therefore, the anticipated utility assumption is less an alternative to a 
general equilibrium approach, than an attempt to investigate what allows us to acknowledge 
that, from a certain moment, we are entitled to admit that preferences are given. 
 
4. From the time of assessment to the time of deliberation 
 The mental process to which attention has been paid until now unfolds from the 
identification of the potential pleasures and pains associated to the set of achievable 
trajectories, to the effective decision which should follow it. Bentham’s “felicific calculus” 
then appears as an attempt to give an account of this process. 
 It must be underlined that the felicific calculus covers two distinctive operations: i) the 
assessment of anticipated utility – of pleasure and pain – associated to each trajectory, and ii) 
the deliberation which leads from a simple comparative assessment of utility towards a 
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decision involving a choice. No doubt that in Bentham’s mind, the time of assessment and the 
time of deliberation were melted. However, his meticulous discussion of both operations 
helps distinguishing them. 
4.1. The time of assessment: what does it mean, being a bad calculator ? 
 The time of assessment is concerned in order to explain what would be, from a 
Benthamite point of view, a “bad calculator”. This latter is characterised by his poor ability to 
assess correctly the consequences of his acts in terms of utility – that is, to use efficiently all 
available information. Such would be, for instance, a criminal that cannot be deterred in his 
enterprises, even by the most severe perspective of punishment. In terms of the formalization 
of the previous sections, this means that the individual considers as optimal an anticipated 
trajectory which is not. Now, this point deserves special attention. Indeed, this “is not” is 
rather puzzling, since it echoes the juncture between the positive and the normative aspects of 
the principle of utility. Of course, it does not imply that the agent, after anticipating a 
trajectory, anticipates an other trajectory, that would lead him to a new final situation which 
both improves his anticipated utility, and was previously reachable: in other words, it has 
nothing to do with the possible existence of conflicting preference orders. Nor is it the result 
of the awareness, after the trajectory is achieved, that this latter was sub-optimal: after all, 
even if his enterprise fails, the criminal might persist in his error – that is, in his bad 
assessment. The fact that an alleged optimal trajectory “is not” optimal simply means that the 
agent’s calculation is not consistent with his tastes. However, since we implicitly admitted 
until now that the description of tastes is nothing else but the calculation of anticipated utility 
generated by trajectories, the break between tastes and calculation comes down to turning to 
an external reference, some kind of picture of the agent, with the same tastes, but with a 
perfect knowledge of these tastes. 
 It is clear that the normative aspect of Bentham’s principle of utility rests on this 
duality. Whereas individual agents act according to what they believe to be their optimal 
trajectories, the Benthamite legislator aims at taking into account what optimal trajectories 
would be in case of perfect knowledge of the tastes, and compares them to the actual 
behaviour of the individuals. This helps explain the reasons why Benthamite economics is, 
from the beginning, public economics: public intervention is, of course, required in order to 
provide adequate information, to make up for external effects and coordination failures (see 
Sigot 1993); but it is also required to ensure the internal consistency of each individual – that 
is, the consistency between his tastes and his resulting choices. 
 Several aspects of Bentham’s legal reflection testify the permanency of his interest on 
the difficulties which come out during the time of assessment. His already mentioned 
involvement in an educational project (supra, § 1.2.) illustrates this point. Similarly, the first 
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“rule as to emoluments” (1782-7: 237-9), which advocates an “intimate connection between 
the duty and the interest of the person employed”, makes obvious that Bentham considered 
that reducing the temporal gap between associated pleasures and pains helps improve the 
workers’ ability to estimate the consequences of their actions in terms of utility. Numerous 
other examples – like his involvement in the debates concerning the “Poor Laws” – attest to 
Bentham’s effort to identify the source of this insufficient ability, and to provide proper 
solution. Evidently, this brings to the forefront the important question of the capacity of his 
recommendations to move each individual into a good calculator. 
 Self-enforcing mechanisms – illustrated by what Bentham called “self-executing laws” 
(Ibid.: 199-200) – play here a crucial part. Except in the case of direct constraint, of which the 
“Panopticon” is a typical instance, the utilitarianist educational project, in its broad sense, 
calls for each individual own interest, and therefore for his participation. For instance, if one 
knows that the ability to identify an optimal trajectory consistent with tastes is improved by 
learning, one is induced to learn how to identify this trajectory, even when this latter is not 
clearly anticipated. In other words, Bentham suggests that some transformation of  an 
individual’s set of choice might give him the opportunity to apply felicific  calculus as 
efficiently as possible.  
 
4.2.  The time of deliberation: resolving the conflict between preference orders 
 Let us then assume that these recommendations are implemented, and that they are a 
success. Imagine that the required information is available and that, owing to the wisdom of a 
Benthamite legislator, the discrepancy between tastes and calculation has disappeared from 
the surface of the Earth. Coming after assessment, deliberation would hence appear as the 
simple acknowledgement of a non-disputable optimal trajectory – that is, of the action for 
which the balance between pleasure and pain is the greatest. The resulting picture of an 
individual whose tastes are perfectly consistent with choices, and the well-known Veblenian 
caricature of the neo-classical economic agent, are now as like as two peas. It seems to be the 
end of the story. 
 It is not. What we described in § 2 and 3 assumes that the time of assessment is over, 
and proposes a rather elementary investigation into deliberation. The investigation is 
elementary because it supposes that, given an initial situation, the individual will follow an 
optimal trajectory, even if his preference orders are conflicting. Let us focus on this point. 
The Benthamite asymmetry between pleasure and pain rests on a special type of sensitivity – 
namely, that “the pleasure of gaining is not equal to the evil of losing”. The statu quo property 
of these conflicting preference orders (supra § 3.1.1. and 3.1.2.) implies that when an agent 
has achieved an optimal trajectory, no other final situation, previously reachable and preferred 
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from another initial situation, would ever seem better to him. Now, from an associationist 
point of view, it might be argued that, when you meet successively the same initial situation, 
the “copies of sensations” remain of the same nature, do not give birth to new ideas, so that 
no true deliberation is required to lead you straight from your preferences to your choice. 
There is, of course, such a position in Bentham’s works – especially when he deals with civil 
servants, stiffened by a rigid legislation.  
 However, as far as civil servants are no more concerned, the repetition of an identical 
initial situation becomes exceptional. The same associationist argument hence leads one to 
quite different conclusions: experimenting various initial situations now brings about different 
“copies of sensations”. In such a case, the individual knows what his optimal trajectory would 
be. But he is also aware that, starting from another initial situation, he would have preferred a 
situation that he now does not prefer. Moreover, it is even not necessary to assume effective 
changes in the initial situation: the ability to anticipate various trajectories comes with the 
ability to anticipate various initial situations. Henceforth, the assumption of correct 
assessment also means that the individual might be faced with conflicting preference orders. 
Resolving this conflict is therefore the stake of deliberation.  
 Again, the example of the Benthamite labour contract, examined above (§ 3.2), 
suggests some indications concerning what Bentham had in mind. On the one hand, it is 
possible to argue that the legislator who implements a contract associating high wages with a 
conditional penalty – instead of a contract stipulating low wages, possibly increased by a 
premium if the task is correctly performed – is chiefly concerned with the Benthamite 
objective of “abundance”, requiring a high level of production. But, on the other hand, the 
legislator knows that he does not really hurt any worker’s direct interest. Since the set of 
choices among final situations is the same for both types of contracts, the workers, like the 
legislator, are induced to neglect the effects of asymmetric sensitivity to pleasure and pain, in 
favour of utility associated to final situations. Formally, this means that utility associated to a 
final situation can no more be obtained by integrating along a trajectory, like in equation [2.4] 
of § 2 15. The expected support of the workers in favour of the new labour contract shows that 
the legislator is not a dictator; but it also shows that there is no definite break between both 
conceptions of utility since, as a result from their deliberation, workers can persuade 
themselves that this contract is a solution to their conflicting preferences.  
Of course, the outcome of this deliberation will not be the same for all individuals. Not 
only some of them remain sensitive to trajectories, but even in the case when this sensitivity is 
                                                 
15 One of us argued that the difference between the utility of a situation and the utility of a trajectory 
might be rooted in Bentham’s dual conception of the felicific calculus. These two conceptions are respectively 
presented in chapters IV and V of the Introduction to the Principles of Morals and of Legislation. See Sigot 
1995. 
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given up, the relative weights of goods in a final situation might more or less reflect the fear 
of a loss or the hope of a gain 16. This analysis explains the importance of the part played by 
different types of characters within the Benthamite project – such as, for instance, the 
“prudent and well-grounded projector” praised in the Defence of Usury. Far from being an 
accessory illustration, psychological investigation in Bentham’s writings satisfies a theoretical 
requirement: the principle of utility sometimes shows one single path to follow; but more 
often, as a consequence of what Bentham called an “axiom of mental pathology”, it suggests 
that several paths might be practicable. Choosing one of them is hence no more a question of 
rationality, but of character. At least one century ago, for this very reason, the time of 
deliberation which achieves Bentham’s felicific calculus seems to have fled from the 
competence of economists. But there is no evidence that it is out of reach. 
                                                 
16 The “utility of a situation” might therefore be analysed as a special case in which the function ϕ (.) of 
sensitivity to gains and losses, as defined in § 2.1, does not depend any more on the signs of the elements of x'. 
Since the individual becomes insensitive to gains and losses, it is obvious that f x t x t f x ti i i
+ −( ) ( )( ) ( )≤ ≤ϕ . 
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 Annexe 1: Equivalence between monotone and optimal trajectories. 
 
 Let { ( )}~x t and {x(t)} be respectively a monotone and a strictly non-monotone 
trajectory, both beginning in ~x t x t0 0b g b g= , and finishing in ~x t x tf fd i d i= . Anticipated utilities 
of { ( )}~x t  and {x(t)} can be written: 
 U x x x x dtt t t t
t
t f~ ~ ,~ ~a fl qc h a f a fb g a f= ′ ′z ϕ
0
     [A11] 
and: 
 U x x x x dtt t t t
t
t fa fl qc h a f a fb g a f= ′ ′z ϕ ,
0
      [A12]. 
As the signs of ~ ′x1  and ~ ′x2  do not change between t0 and tf, ϕ ~ ,~x xt ta f a fb g′  is continuous, as 
would be a function ϕ x xt ta f a fb g,~ ′  17. { ( )}~x t and {x(t)} having the same initial and final 
situations, the anticipated utility of the former might equivalently be expressed as: 
 U x x x dtt x t t t
t
t f~ ,~a fl qc h a f a fb g a f= ′ ′z ϕ
0
     
 [A13]. 
Consequently, the difference between anticipated utilities is: 
 U x U x x x x x dtt t t t x t t t
t
t fa fl qc h a fl qc h a f a fb g a f a fb gc h a f− = ′ − ′ ′z~ , ,~ϕ ϕ
0
. 
 Now, as {x(t)} is assumed strictly non-monotone, there is necessarily at least one 
interval of time [t1, t2[ within which the signs of at least one component of ′x  and ~ ′x  – say, 
′xi  and ~xi  – are different, so that ϕ ϕi ix x xt t x t ta f a fb g a f a fb g, ,~′ − ′ ≠ 0. Given [2.1] - [2.2] as 
defined in §2.1 above, 
• if ~ ,′> ′ <x xi i0 0, then: 
  ϕ ϕi i i i i ix x x x t f f x tt t x t t x t x ta f a fb g a f a fb gc h b g a fb g a fb gc h b g, ,~′ − ′ ′ = − ′ <− + 0 
• if ~ ,′< ′ >x xi i0 0, then: 
  ϕ ϕi i i i i ix x x x t f f x tt t x t t x t x ta f a fb g a f a fb gc h b g a fb g a fb gc h b g, ,~′ − ′ ′ = − ′ <+ − 0. 
 
In both cases, ϕ ϕx x x xt t x t t ta f a fb g a f a fb gc h a f, ,~′ − ′ ′  is therefore negative for t t t∈[ [1 2, , which 
implies that U x U xt ta fl qc h a fl qc h− ~  is also negative. As a result, all monotone trajectories from 
x(t0) to x(tf) are optimal, and all the strictly non-monotone trajectories are non-optimal. As a 
result, it should be noted that inequation [2.5] in §2.2 might then be strengthened: 
U x U xt ta fl qc h a fl qc h>  when { ( )}x t is monotone and {x(t)} is strictly non-monotone. 
 
                                                 
17  The function ϕ x xt t( ) ( )( )′,~  might be interpreted as a function of sensitivity to gains and losses, 
under this special assumption that, although the agent anticipates a trajectory {x(t)}, he keeps the same 
sensitivity to gains and losses as the one which prevailed all along { ( )}~x t . 
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Annexe 2: The conditions for preference reversal 
 
 Let Δ0 and Δ1 be the respective difference of anticipated utility between the non-statu 
quo and the statu quo trajectories That is, 
 Δ0 01 00 01 01 01
0
1= − = zU x U x x t x t x t dtt t tta fm re j a fm re j b g b gc h b gϕ , ' '   [A21] 
 Δ1 10 11 10 10 10
0
1= − = zU x U x x t x t x t dtt t tta fm re j a fm re j b g b gc h b gϕ , ' '   [A22] 
 Let us first examine the meaning and properties of the sum of Δ0 and Δ1. Obviously, it 
represents the variation of anticipated utility generated by the successive performance of 
{x01(t)} and {x10(t)}, that is by a non-optimal trajectory {x010(t)}, made up with an optimal 
move from x0 to x1, followed by an other optimal move, going back to x0. Given [2.5] (above, 
§2.2), {x00(t)} being, itself, an optimal trajectory which gives birth to a zero variation of 
anticipated utility, {x010(t)} is necessarily associated with a negative variation of anticipated 
utility. Thus, 
 Δ0 + Δ1 < 0         [A23] 
Since {x01(t)} and {x10(t)} are both optimal trajectories, [2.5] and [A23] imply that any 
trajectory, going from x0 to x0 through x1, generates a decrease in anticipated utility, at most 
equal to Δ0 + Δ1. This conclusion is, of course, intuitive, since departing from x0 and coming 
back to it means that something has been gained and lost, involving more pain than pleasure. 
 Turning back to preference reversal, [A23] also implies that this latter only occurs 
when Δ0 and Δ1 are both negative. It follows that x1 can be neither greater nor smaller than x0. 
We might then conclude that a necessary and sufficient condition for preference reversal is 
that x1 satisfies: 
 
Δ
Δ
Δ
Δ
0
1 0
1
0 1
0
1 0
1
0 1
0
0
0
0
= − <
= − <
R
S|
T|
= − <
= − <
R
S|
T|
+− +−
−+ −+
−+ −+
+− +−
F x F x
F x F x
F x F x
F x F x
c h c h
c h c h
c h c h
c h c h
and    or   and   [A24] 
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Annexe 3: The general case of preference reversal  
 
Assume that from x0, two optimal trajectories { }x A t0 a f  and { }x B t0 a f lead respectively to xA and 
xB, so that  
 U x U xA Bt t{ } { }0 0a fc h a fc h>        [A31].  
If there be a situation x1, from which two other optimal trajectories, { }x A t1 a f  and { }x B t1 a f  also 
lead to xA and xB, so that  
 U x U xB At t{ } { }1 1a fc h a fc h>        [A32],  
it is considered that the shift from the ancient to the new initial situation generates preference 
reversal between xA and xB (figure A1). 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1: Preference reversal between xA and xB generated by a shift of the initial situation from x0 to x1 
 
 Suppose, now, a non-optimal trajectory {x0AB(t)}, in which the agent anticipates an 
optimal move from x0 to xA, and then an other optimal move from xA to xB. The anticipated 
utility of this trajectory is: 
 U x U x U xAB A ABt t t0 0a fm re j a fm re j a fm re j= + . 
From [2.5], it is deduced that U x U xAB Bt t0 0a fm re j a fm re j<  and, if [A32] is true, that: 
 U x AB ta fm re j < 0. 
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In the same way, considering a non-optimal trajectory {x1AB(t)}, we might conclude from 
[A32] that: 
 U x BA ta fm re j < 0. 
Hence, if [A31] and [A32] are simultaneously verified, the locations of xA and xB necessarily 
imply: 
 
F x F x
F x F x
A B
B A
−+ −+
+− +−
>
>
R
S|
T|
c h c h
c h c h
and   or 
F x F x
F x F x
B A
A B
−+ −+
+− +−
>
>
R
S|
T|
c h c h
c h c h
and    [A33] 
We might then conclude that, given [A31], if xA and xB relative positions satisfy conditions 
[A33] some x1 (for example, x1 = xB) allowing [A32] – that is, preference reversal – could be 
found. 
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Annexe 4: The contract set and the characterisation of general equilibrium 
 
 Let us consider the simple case of a bilateral exchange between two agents, A and B, 
as represented in the box-diagram of figure A2. 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2: Contract set and general equilibrium 
 A first observation should be made. Assume that for prices p(t1), x0 is not an 
equilibrium for both A and B, but there exists a final situation x1 which is an equilibrium. The 
inducement to move towards x1 is then an inducement to proceed to symmetric exchanges, so 
that when A’s maximisation program is [3.2], B’s is [3.3] (as defined above in §3.3), and 
reciprocally. Henceforth, we are faced with two contract curves C1 and C2 – instead of one, in 
the usual case – defined as the respective loci of the points of tangency of the contours of 
F xA
−+ b g and F xB+− b g: 
 C1 : f x f x f x f xA A B B1 2 1 2
− + + −=b g b g b g b g 
and of F xA
+− b g and F xB−+ b g: 
 C2 : f x f x f x f xA A B B1 2 1 2
+ − − +=b g b g b g b g. 
 Since the inequalities [2.1] and [2.2] hold for A and B, and because the marginal rates 
of substitution are decreasing, C2 is located, from the point of view of A, above C1. The two 
contract curves then generate three regions: Ω1 under C1; Ω2 between C1 and C2 (both 
included); Ω3 above C2. 
• x0 ∈ Ω1:  
Since in Ω1, A’s left-hand and B’s right-hand marginal rates of substitution are such that 
f x f x f x f xA A B B1
0
2
0
1
0
2
0− + + −<c h c h c h c h, A (resp. B) can improve his anticipated utility by 
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performing exchanges where he supplies (resp. demands) good 1 and demands (resp. 
supplies) good 2. On the contrary, since f x f x f x f xA A B B1
0
2
0
1
0
2
0+ − − +<c h c h c h c h, A (resp. B) 
cannot improve his anticipated utility by giving up good 1 (resp. good 2) in exchange of good 
2 (resp. good 1). A general equilibrium is thus a price vector p* for which the budget line 
intersects C1 in x* where  
 f x f x f x f x p pA A B B1 2 1 2 1 2
− + + −= =* * * * * *b g b g b g b g . 
• x0 ∈ Ω3:  
This is the exact symmetric of the previous case. The respective values of A’s and B’s 
marginal rates of substitution are now such that f x f x f x f xA A B B1
0
2
0
1
0
2
0+ − − +>c h c h c h c h and 
f x f x f x f xA A B B1
0
2
0
1
0
2
0− + + −>c h c h c h c h. Only exchanges involving (from A’s point of view) a 
demand of good 1 and a supply of good 2 might improve both A’s and B’s anticipated utility, 
equilibrium lying in C2, so that: 
 f x f x f x f x p pA A B B1 2 1 2 1 2
+ − − += =* * * * * *b g b g b g b g . 
• x0 ∈ Ω2:  
In  Ω2, the marginal rates of substitution are such that f x f x f x f xA A B B1 0 2 0 1 0 2 0+ − − +<c h c h c h c h and 
f x f x f x f xA A B B1
0
2
0
1
0
2
0− + + −>c h c h c h c h. A’s and B’s indifference curves relative to x0 have 
henceforth no other common point that x0 itself, so that no anticipated exchange would be 
Pareto-optimal. The contract set is then the entire region Ω2, within which equilibrium supply 
and demand are zero, at equilibrium prices belonging to a close interval defined by: 
 sup  inf  f x f x f x f x p p f x f x f x f xA A B B A A B B1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
+ − + − − + − +≤ ≤b g b g b g b gc h b g b g b g b gc h, * * , . 
 The particularity of exchange between two agents who share asymmetric sensitivity to 
gains and losses hence comes from the existence of a contract set – and not only of a contract 
curve. Equilibrium final situations of optimal trajectories are then distinct from initial 
situations only when the latter are located outside the contract set. And in this case, they 
always lie on the borders of the contract set – that is, either on C1, or on C2 18. 
 
                                                 
18 For instance, on figure A2, x pE E* *,b g is an equilibrium for x E0 , x pG G* *,b g for x G0 , and x pF F* *,b g 
for x F0 . 
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